An orbital simulation program is described that uses a geometrical approach to emulate gravitational and atomic orbits at the Planck scale. The gravitational orbital approach divides orbiting objects into multiples of Planck mass points to form an n-body complex of discrete point-to-point orbital pairs between the objects. Each orbital pair rotates 1 Planck length per unit of Planck time in a continuous loop such that when mapped over time gravitational orbits emerge. However 1 point may contain 10^{20} or more individual (...) particles, and so to analyze individual particle-particle orbital pairing we can use atomic orbital transitions. For this, the gravitation simulation program is modified to map the orbital of an electron-proton pair (H-atom) by the addition of an alpha (fine structure constant) term. For transitions, the incoming photon is absorbed by (or ejected from) the orbital radius in discrete alpha steps (the orbital radius is assigned photon-like properties), the electron itself has a passive role in the transition process. An orbital radius variable delta; orbital radius = (2alpha + delta)*lambda(electron+proton), was selected to correlate with the Lyman series transition frequencies. A linear relationship was observed between delta and these frequencies with notably at delta = 0 (the classical Bohr model), the principal quantum number n = sqrt(2) and the transition energy = half ionization energy. (shrink)

An underappreciated fact in the history of analytic philosophy is that American pragmatism had an early and strong influence on the Vienna Circle. The path of that influence goes from Charles Peirce to Frank Ramsey to Ludwig Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick. That path is traced in this paper, and along the way some standard understandings of Ramsey and Wittgenstein, especially, are radically altered.

When fat people are depicted in popular media, we often take their behavior to be representative of all fat people. How one fat person acts becomes representative of a broader pattern of behavior that all fat people are presumed to share, shaping the way we understand fatness. This way of generalizing presents fatness as a singular experience, reducing fat people to a monolithic narrative that often reinforces anti-fat bias. How do we avoid this reduction? How can we responsibly depict fat (...) characters without perpetuating negative stereotypes about real fat people? Using the case of “Fat Thor” from Avengers: Endgame, I propose the beginnings of an account of responsible artistic agency which can be used to improve the ways that marginalized communities are depicted in art, with a particular focus on fat communities. Central to this account are two features: inclusion of and deference to members of the communities depicted from a variety of backgrounds throughout the production process, and mindfulness of the preexisting narrative web built around the communities depicted. I will use this discussion to highlight the need for a drastic shift in how we consider marginalized populations in art—in reimagining both who tells their stories, and what stories are told on their behalf. (shrink)

Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. (...) But this argument works only if the following claims are true: all humans have access to roadkill, roadkill would go to waste if those who happen upon it don’t themselves consume it, it’s impossible to harvest vegetables without killing animals, the animals who are killed in plant production are all-things-considered harmed by crop farming, and the best arguments for vegetarianism all endorse the harm principle. As I will argue in this paper, each claim is deeply problematic. Consequently, in most cases, humans ought to strictly eat plants and save the roadkill for cats. (shrink)

This article argues that Rousseau's endorsement of male domination and his illiberal views of rape, punishment and the education of women have been seriously underestimated by twentieth century commentators who tend to produce expoisitions of his work that evade, ignore or marginalise this 'darker side' of his educational philosophy.

It seems that no philosopher these days wants a theory of truth which can be accused of being metaphysical. But even if we agree that grandiose metaphysics is to be spurned, even if we agree that our theory of truth should be a deflated one, the controversy does not die down. A variety of deflationist options present themselves. Some, with Richard Rorty, take the notion of truth to be so wedded to metaphysics that we are advised to drop it altogether. (...) Others, with Paul Horwich, take the disquotational or equivalence schema—'p' is T if and only if p—to completely capture the content of the predicate 'is true'. And others argue that there is a conception of truth to be had which is non-metaphysical but which goes beyond the triviality expressed by the disquotational schema. (shrink)

In this paper we track the ‘body positivity’ movement from its origins, promoting radical acceptance of marginalized bodies, to its co-optation as a push for self-love for all bodies, including those bodies belonging to socially dominant groups. We argue that the new focus on the ‘body positivity’ movement involves a single-minded emphasis on beauty and aesthetic adornment, and that this undermines the original focus of social and political equality, pandering instead to capitalism and failing to rectify unjust institutions and policies. (...) As such, we argue that the ‘body positivity’ movement ultimately marginalises further the bodies for which it initially sought justice and acceptance. (shrink)

It is argued that whenever component parts are assembled into an integrated whole, some of the properties defining the qualitative identities of the components are lost, and therefore the components as such have ceased to exist, at least temporarily. They have been replaced by a structure, which has different properties and behaviour from its components. In the process of creating a structure some properties are lost and others are gained, so rather than saying "a whole is more than the sum (...) of its parts" it would be more accurate to say "a whole is instead of its parts". It is suggested that the visual perception of components continuing to exist intact within solid structures is illusory, a result of the way our perceptual and cognitive processes habitually operate. The relation between physical structures and consciousness is briefly discussed, in the context of the physical universe conceived as one continuous structure uniting all individual physical entities. (shrink)

In recent discussions, it has been argued that a theory of animal rights is at odds with a liberal abortion policy. In response, Francione (1995) argues that the principles used in the animal rights discourse do not have implications for the abortion debate. I challenge Francione’s conclusion by illustrating that his own framework of animal rights, supplemented by a relational account of moral obligation, can address the moral issue of abortion. I first demonstrate that Francione’s animal rights position, which grounds (...) moral consideration in sentience, is committed to the claim that a sentient fetus has a right to life. I then illustrate that a fully developed account of animal rights that recognizes the special obligations humans have to assist animals when we cause them to be dependent and vulnerable through our voluntary actions or omissions is committed to the following: a woman also has a special obligation to assist a sentient fetus when she causes it to be dependent and vulnerable through her voluntary actions or omissions. From these considerations, it will become evident that a fully developed and consistent animal rights ethic does in fact have implications for the abortion discussion. (shrink)

In response to my argument against Aristotle’s claim that humans are more political than other animals, Edward Jacobs counters that the evidence I use from cognitive ethology and my application of evolutionary principles fail to demonstrate that other animals are as political as humans. Jacobs furthermore suggests that humans are more political than other animals by pointing to the political variation in human communities. In this article, I defend my use of evolutionary principles and my interpretation of anecdotes from cognitive (...) ethology, while challenging Jacobs’s assertion that human political variation implies that humans are more political than other animals. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that, in addition to the negative duty not to harm nonhuman animals, moral agents have a positive duty to assist nonhuman animals who are victims of injustice. This claim is not unproblematic because, in many cases, assisting a victim of injustice requires that we harm some other nonhuman animal(s). For instance, in order to feed victims of injustice who are obligate carnivores, we must kill some other animal(s). It seems, then, that (...) sometimes the duty to assist nonhuman animals who are victims of injustice conflicts with the prima facie duty not to harm nonhuman animals. In defense of Regan’s theory against this apparent inconsistency, I introduce an additional principle, the “guardianship principle,” which can be used to illustrate how we can be justified, under certain conditions, in overriding our prima facie duty not to harm nonhuman animals in order to fulfill our duty to assist nonhuman animals who are victims of injustice. (shrink)

Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...) concepts differ systematically from what scholars, courts, and perhaps legislators, have assumed. -/- As implemented, mens rea concepts are much more context-dependent and normatively evaluative than the conventional wisdom suggests, even assuming that jurors are following jury instructions to the letter. As a result, there is less difference between knowledge and recklessness than is typically assumed; jurors consistently “over”-ascribe knowledge to criminal defendants; and concepts like “belief,” “awareness,” and “conscious disregard” mean different things in different contexts, resulting in mens rea findings systematically responsive to aspects of the case traditionally considered irrelevant to the meaning of those terms. -/- This Article provides the first systematic account of the factors driving jurors’ ascriptions of the specific belief states criminal law invokes. After surveying mens rea jury instructions, introducing the Experimental Epistemology literature to the legal literature on mens rea, and examining the implications of that literature for criminal law, this Article considers ways to begin bridging the surprisingly large gap between mens rea theory and practice. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the analysis of the feasibility of global justice developed by Pablo Gilabert in his recent book From Global Poverty to Global Equality: A Philosophical Exploration. Gilabert makes many valuable contributions to this topic and I agree with most of his analysis. However, I identify a distinction between strategic justification and moral justification that Gilabert neglects. I show how this distinction is useful in addressing objections to the feasibility of global justice. I also claim that Gilabert (...) makes some problematic assumptions concerning the way in which global justice is morally demanding. (shrink)

While theories of animal rights maintain that nonhuman animals possess prima facie rights, such as the right to life, the dominant philosophies of animal rights permit the killing of nonhuman animals for reasons of self-defense. I argue that the animal rights discourse on defensive killing is problematic because it seems to entail that any nonhuman animal who poses a threat to human beings can be justifiably harmed without question. To avoid this human-privileged conclusion, I argue that the animal rights position (...) needs to both (1) deploy a new criterion of liability to defensive harm, and (2) seriously consider whether human beings themselves are liable to defensive harm in human-animal conflicts. By shifting the focus to whether humans are liable to defensive harm, we will find that in many situations of human-animal conflict, human beings are actually the ones liable to be harmed because they are often culpable or, to some degree, morally responsible for posing an unjust threat to nonhuman animals. (shrink)

The discourses of Antillanité and Créolité are both based on the absence of women. This is more important in the discourse of Créolité since it silences the grandmothers, great aunts and village midwives who are the transmitters of folk tales, folk medicines and oral culture. In the struggle for recognition between Caribbean males and western males folk medicine may be too closely associated with the denigrated female role to be considered a suitable inclusion into modern development.

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality, including the earth and the universe, is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation, and as such our reality is an illusion. In this essay I describe a method for programming mass, length, time and charge (MLTA) as geometrical objects derived from the formula for a virtual electron; $f_e = 4\pi^2r^3$ ($r = 2^6 3 \pi^2 \alpha \Omega^5$) where the fine structure constant $\alpha$ = 137.03599... and $\Omega$ = 2.00713494... (...) are mathematical constants and the MLTA geometries are; M = (1), T = ($2\pi$), L = ($2\pi^2\Omega^2$), A = ($4\pi \Omega)^3/\alpha$. As objects they are independent of any set of units and also of any numbering system, terrestrial or alien. As the geometries are interrelated according to $f_e$, we can replace designations such as ($kg, m, s, A$) with a rule set; mass = $u^{15}$, length = $u^{-13}$, time = $u^{-30}$, ampere = $u^{3}$. The formula $f_e$ is unit-less ($u^0$) and combines these geometries in the following ratio M$^9$T$^{11}$/L$^{15}$ and (AL)$^3$/T, as such these ratio are unit-less. To translate MLTA to their respective SI Planck units requires an additional 2 unit-dependent scalars. We may thereby derive the CODATA 2014 physical constants via the 2 (fixed) mathematical constants ($\alpha, \Omega$), 2 dimensioned scalars and the rule set $u$. As all constants can be defined geometrically, the least precise constants ($G, h, e, m_e, k_B$...) can also be solved via the most precise ($c, \mu_0, R_\infty, \alpha$), numerical precision then limited by the precision of the fine structure constant $\alpha$. (shrink)

Following the 26th General Conference on Weights and Measures are fixed the numerical values of the 4 physical constants ($h, c, e, k_B$). This is premised on the independence of these constants. This article discusses a model of a mathematical electron from which can be defined the Planck units as geometrical objects (mass M=1, time T=2$\pi$ ...). In this model these objects are interrelated via this electron geometry such that once we have assigned values to 2 Planck units then we (...) have fixed the values for all Planck units. As all constants can then be defined using geometrical forms (in terms of 2 fixed mathematical constants, 2 unit-specific scalars and a defined relationship between the units $kg, m, s, A$), the least precise CODATA 2014 constants ($G, h, e, m_e, k_B$...) can then be solved via the most precise ($c, \mu_0, \alpha, R_\infty$), with numerical precision limited by the precision of the fine structure constant $\alpha$. In terms of this model we now for example have 2 separate values for elementary charge, calculated from ($c, \alpha, R_\infty$) and the 2017 revision. (shrink)

An orbital simulation program is described that uses a geometrical approach to modeling gravitational and atomic orbits at the Planck scale. Orbiting objects A, B, C... are sub-divided into points, each point representing 1 unit of Planck mass, for example, a 1kg satellite would divide into 1kg/Planck mass = 45940509 points. Each point in object A then forms a rotating orbital pair with every point in objects B, C..., resulting in a universe-wide, n-body network of rotating point-to-point orbital pairs. Each (...) orbital pair rotates 1 unit of Planck length per unit of Planck time at velocity c in hypersphere space co-ordinates, the results then summed and averaged giving the new co-ordinates, the program then repeats. When these rotations are mapped over time in a 3D space, objects A, B, C... appear to be orbiting each other. The basic simulation uses the fine structure constant alpha as an orbital constant to simulate gravitational orbit parameters. As each orbital comprises only 2 points, 1 at each orbital pole, information regarding the objects A, B, C... ; momentum, size, center of mass, barycenter etc ... is not required, instead only the start positions (co-ordinates) of each point are used as initial inputs. Each point, by having a mass of Planck mass, is itself a construct of multiple particles, and so we can also form particle to particle orbital pairs, transition energies for the H atom (an electron-proton orbital pair) are well documented and so can be used as reference. Atomic orbital pairs rotate slower than gravitational orbitals by a factor of alpha, 'gravity' therefore stronger than the 'electric force' when measured at the Planck scale. (shrink)

Outlined here is a simulation hypothesis approach that uses an expanding (the simulation clock-rate measured in units of Planck time) 4-axis hyper-sphere and mathematical particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass (unit of Planck mass per unit of Planck time) point-state. Particles are assigned a spin axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled by this (hyper-sphere pilot wave) expansion, thus all particles travel at, and only at, the velocity of expansion (the origin of $c$), (...) however only the particle point-state has definable co-ordinates within the hyper-sphere. Photons are the mechanism of information exchange, as they lack a mass state they can only travel laterally (in hypersphere co-ordinate terms) between particles and so this hypersphere expansion cannot be directly observed, relativity then becomes the mathematics of perspective translating between the absolute (hypersphere) and the relative motion (3D space) co-ordinate systems. A discrete `pixel' lattice geometry is assigned as the gravitational space. Units of $\hbar c$ `physically' link particles into orbital pairs. As these are direct particle to particle links, a gravitational force between macro objects is not required, the gravitational orbit as the sum of these individual orbiting pairs. A 14.6 billion year old hyper-sphere (the sum of Planck black-hole units) has similar parameters to the cosmic microwave background. The Casimir force is a measure of the background radiation density. (shrink)

The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that all of reality is in fact an artificial simulation, analogous to a computer simulation. Outlined here is a method for programming relativistic mass, space and time at the Planck level as applicable for use in Planck Universe-as-a-Simulation Hypothesis. For the virtual universe the model uses a 4-axis hyper-sphere that expands in incremental steps (the simulation clock-rate). Virtual particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass point-state are mapped within this hyper-sphere, the oscillation driven (...) by this expansion. Particles are assigned an N-S axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled along by the expansion, thus an independent particle motion may be dispensed with. Only in the mass point-state do particles have fixed hyper-sphere co-ordinates. The rate of expansion translates to the speed of light and so in terms of the hyper-sphere co-ordinates all particles (and objects) travel at the speed of light, time (as the clock-rate) and velocity (as the rate of expansion) are therefore constant, however photons, as the means of information exchange, are restricted to lateral movement across the hyper-sphere thus giving the appearance of a 3-D space. Lorentz formulas are used to translate between this 3-D space and the hyper-sphere co-ordinates, relativity resembling the mathematics of perspective. (shrink)

If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately (...) be united as, or in, some single conscious entity underlying the apparent plurality of individuals. (shrink)

Necessity is a touchstone issue in the thought of Charles Peirce, not least because his pragmatist account of meaning relies upon modal terms. We here offer an overview of Peirce’s highly original and multi-faceted take on the matter. We begin by considering how a self-avowed pragmatist and fallibilist can even talk about necessary truth. We then outline the source of Peirce’s theory of representation in his three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, (monadic, dyadic and triadic relations). These have modal (...) purport insofar as the first category corresponds to possibility, the second to mechanical necessity and the third to a kind of semantic or intentional necessity. We then turn to Peirce’s explicit modal epistemology and show how it began as information-relative, with different modalities (e.g. logical, physical, practical) distinguished in terms of respective ‘designated states of information’, and shifted later in his life towards a more robust realism founded in direct perception of ideas in their relations. We then turn to Peirce’s formal logic, focusing on his diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs where he did his most serious logical research. Finally we discuss Peirce’s modal metaphysics and its implications for determinism and realism about universals. (shrink)

The University of Vienna saw witness to the Opening Conference of the ESF-Research Networking Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European perspective” (PSE) which was organised by the Vienna Circle Institute and took place on the 18-20 December at the Campus of the University of Vienna, 2008. Its overarching aim was to set the background for a collaborative project organising, systematising, and ultimately forging an identity for, European philosophy of science by creating research structures and developing research networks across (...) Europe to promote its development. As such under the general rubric of ‘the present situation in the philosophy of science’, the emphasis was on as a first step identifying traditions and research structures already present, and the directions in which this research was leading. (shrink)

We argue that many recent philosophical discussions about the reference of everyday concepts of intentional states have implicitly been predicated on descriptive theories of reference. To rectify this, we attempt to demonstrate how a causal theory can be applied to intentional concepts. Specifically, we argue that some phenomena in early social de- velopment ðe.g., mimicry, gaze following, and emotional contagionÞ can serve as refer- ence fixers that enable children to track others’ intentional states and, thus, to refer to those states. (...) This allows intentional concepts to be anchored to their referents, even if folk psy- chological descriptions turn out to be false. (shrink)

This paper examines a variety of social scientific studies purporting to demonstrate that transracial adoption is in the best interests of children. Finding flaws in these studies and the ethical and political arguments based upon such scientific findings, we argue for adoption practices and policies that respect the racial and ethnic identities of children of color and their communities of origin.

Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science (...) with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science. (shrink)

This is a response to Macleod 2012's argument that the history of unjust property acquisitions requires rich libertarians to give away everything in excess of equality. At first, problematic questions are raised. How much property is usually inherited or illegitimate? Why should legitimate inheritance be affected? What of the burden of proof and court cases? A counterfactual problem is addressed. Three important cases are considered: great earned wealth; American slavery; land usurpation. All are argued to be problematic for (...) class='Hi'>Macleod 2012's thesis. Various problems are explained concerning using the Nozickian argument to decide the alleged excess that rich libertarians own. The essay's main error is the presupposition that free markets do not help the worst-off. The majority of unjust holdings today are not the result of historical injustices but arise through continuing transfers enabled by taxation and state-regulation. More study of libertarian contributions to the social sciences and philosophy would appear to be desirable "personal behavior" among socialists. (shrink)

In The American Pragmatists (2013), Cheryl Misak casts Peirce and Lewis as the heroes of American pragmatism. She establishes an impressive continuity between pragmatism and both logical empiricism and contemporary analytic philosophy. However, in casting James and Dewey as the villains of American pragmatism, she underplays the pragmatists' interest in action.

A book review of Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers, by Cheryl Misak (OUP, 2020).

Does it matter that almost all juries in England and Wales are all-White? Does it matter even if this result is the unintended and undesired result of otherwise acceptable ways of choosing juries? Finally, does it matter that almost all juries are all-White if this has no adverse effect on the treatment of non-White defendants and victims of crime? According to Cheryl Thomas, there is no injustice in a system of jury selection which predictably results in juries with no (...) minority members so long as this result is not deliberate, and does not adversely affect the treatment of minority defendants and victims of crime. My view is different. In and of itself, I believe, something is wrong with a system of jury selection that predictably results in all-White juries in a diverse society, such as our own. Absent reason to believe that we lack a better alternative to current modes of jury selection, a commitment to democratic government and to the equality of citizens – or so I will argue – condemns existing arrangements as unjust, whether or not they have adverse effects on jury decisions, or on the ways in which our society approaches issues of race and crime. (shrink)

Cheryl Hall has argued that framing of climate change must acknowledge the sacrifices needed to reach a sustainable future. This paper builds on that argument. Although it is important to acknowledge the value of what must be sacrificed, this paper argues that current frames about the environment falsely portray humans and the environment as in a zero-sum game, and in doing so ask people to give up the wrong things. This could undermine the public’s trust in environmentalism, and might (...) even create a backlash against action on climate change. I propose we need alternative framing that portrays humans as a keystone species, and highlights positive human activity. (shrink)

Cheryl Misak (2000; 2008a; 2008b; Misak and Talisse 2014; Misak and Talisse 2021) has presented an argument for democracy based on her analysis of the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce: If we care about the truth of our beliefs – as everyone does, according to Misak – then we ought to support democratic norms and democratic political institutions. We argue in the present paper that Misak’s argument does not adequately justify a democratic political system. Her argument does, however, justify (...) a rational commitment to the standard liberal-democratic values of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the like. We demonstrate as well that Misak’s argument for the democratic values withstands well-known objections against her argument for a democratic political system. We also show that weaker premises involving every agent’s commitment to pursuing their own subjective ends can get us to Misak’s conclusions regarding liberal values using reasoning otherwise similar to Misak’s in that our alternative premises also get us to the commitment to taking the experiences of others seriously. These weaker premises avoid objections raised against Misak’s Peircean view and are acceptable even to those who reject Misak’s idea, taken from her reading of Peirce, that truth is a constitutive norm of belief. (shrink)

Andreas Gursky is the darling of philosophers and art theorists of all kinds of traditions and denominations. He has been used as a prime example of the return of the sublime in contemporary art, as a trailblazer in the use of the digital manipulation of images in order to represent something abstract and even as a philosopher of perception who makes some subtle point about the nature of visual experience. All of these arguments are based on some or another (...) technological innovation Gursky uses: the size of his photos, their postproduction (often digital) manipulation and their unusually high resolution. The aim of this paper is to shift the emphasis from these arguments on the significance of the new technology in Gursky’s oeuvre to a much more important role technology plays in his works, namely, in their aesthetics. (shrink)

A central theme of Cheryl Misak’s important new history is that there are two markedly different strands of the pragmatist tradition. One pragmatism traces back to Peirce, she thinks, and it takes seriously the ideals of logical precision, truth, and objectivity. This tradition had its insights carried through later analytic philosophy by figures like C. I. Lewis, Quine, and Davidson, among others. The second pragmatism has its roots in James’s (allegedly) more subjectivistic outlook and after Dewey’s death was revived (...) by Goodman, Rorty, and other so-called “neo-pragmatists.”Misak recommends the Peircean strain because it is “committed to doing justice to the objective dimension of human inquiry” (Misak 2013: 3)... (shrink)

For example, Cheryl Misak in her book-length examination of verificationism writes that ‘the holist [such as Quine] need not reject verificationism, if it is suitably formulated. Indeed, Quine often describes himself as a verificationist’.[iii] Misak concludes that Quine ‘can be described as a verificationist who thinks that the unit of meaning is large’;[iv] and when comparing Dummett and Quine, Misak states that ‘both can be, and in fact are, verificationists’.[v].

Interest in the nature and importance of ‘childhood goods’ recently has emerged within philosophy. Childhood goods, roughly, are things that are good for persons qua children independent of any contribution to the good of persons qua adults. According to Colin Macleod, John Rawls’s political conception of justice as fairness rests upon an adult-centered ‘agency assumption’ and thus is incapable of incorporating childhood goods into its content. Macleod concludes that because of this, justice as fairness cannot be regarded as (...) a complete conception of distributive justice. In this paper I provide a political liberal response to Macleod’s argument by advancing three claims. First, I propose that political liberalism should treat leisure time as a distinct ‘primary good.’ Second, I suggest that leisure time should be distributed via the ‘basic needs principle’ and the ‘difference principle’ for all citizens over the course of their complete lives, including their childhoods. Third, the provision of leisure time in this way supports the realization of childhood goods for citizens. (shrink)

This case examines the rise and fall of WeWork—a company that experienced one of the most dramatic changes of fortune in technology company history. For several years, WeWork was a Silicon Valley darling, growing at breakneck speed with visionary Adam Neumann at the helm. By some estimates, Neumann’s company was worth $47 billion in January of 2019. But when the company filed paperwork in preparation for going public later that year, investors balked at the details revealed in the documents: (...) billions of dollars in losses and lots of questionable behavior on the part of Neumann (including numerous conflicts of interest involving his personal business dealings). The IPO was postponed and later withdrawn; Neumann was forced to step down as CEO; and by May of 2020 the company’s valuation had dropped to $3 billion. Exploring this recent history will provide an opportunity to ask what lessons can be drawn from the rise and fall of WeWork, and from the economic and social context that enabled its growth. (shrink)

Este ensayo expone la manera en que el pensamiento deconstructivo de Jean-Luc Nancy desarrolla un modelo de democracia que va desde sus primeros escritos interpretando a Heidegger y lo elemental del ‘ser-con’ como la categoría por la cual recibimos nuestra experiencia del ser (en un pensamiento que llamamos ‘proto-democrático’) que luego se relacionarán de forma explícita con sus trabajos tardíos sobre la democracia. Siguiendo este trabajo exegético, proponemos una lectura interpretativa que busca argumentar que el pensamiento de Nancy puede ser (...) considerado como un pensamiento infrapolítico en cuanto busca pensar la aporía constitutiva de la democracia que se encuentra perfectamente ilustrado en la noción del ‘nudo’ (como el momento tanto de unión como separación—entre el ‘sí’ y el ‘no’). La noción del ‘nudo infrapolítico’ se utilizará como una forma de darle mayor refinamiento a estos esbozos deconstructivos que aparecen implícitamente en el trabajo de Nancy. -/- This essay elucidates the way in which Jean-Luc Nancy’s deconstructive thought develops a thought of democracy that begins with his first interpretive writings on Heidegger and the ‘being-with’ as an existential category (in a thought that we term ‘proto-democractic’) that will then explicitly relate to his later works on democracy. Following this exegetical work, we offer an interpretive reading that seeks to argue that Nancy’s thought can be considered as an infrapolitical one insofar as it seeks to think the constitutive aporia of democracy that is perfectly captured in the notion of the ‘knot’ (as the moment of both union and separation—between the ‘yes’ and ‘no’). The notion of an ‘infrapolitical knot’ will be used as a way of giving further refinement to the deconstructive sketches that appear implicitly in Nancy’s work. (shrink)

Ziel der Untersuchung ist zu zeigen, inwiefern Hegels Charakterisierung des Schönen als ‚das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee‘ auch für die Deutung des Naturschönen Erklärungswert hat. Vorausgesetzt ist die für den Idea- lismus Hegelscher Prägung zentrale Doktrin, derzufolge der Natur Ideel- les zugrunde liegt. Schön sind dann Naturphänomene, in denen jener ideelle Grund der Natur durchscheint. Das Erfassen von Ideellem scheint ein Privileg geistiger Wesen zu sein. Dem stehen evolutionsbiologische Argumente entgegen, die dem Schönen einen positiven Selektionswert, etwa bei der sexuellen (...) Partnerwahl, zusprechen. Auch der Mensch hat stammesgeschichtliche Wurzeln, die in ihm weiter wirken. Doch sobald der Geist auf der evolutionären Bühne erscheint, herrscht das Biologische nicht länger mit der uneingeschränkten Macht, die es im Rahmen natürli- cher Selektion hat. Hegels Deutung des Schönen, auch des Naturschönen, ist wesentlich bezogen auf den Geist. Ich verdeutliche dies an einigen Exempeln (Schneekristall, musikalische Harmonie, Abendhimmel, Ge- birgslandschaft, organische Blüten- und Körperformen). Aber wodurch sind Naturschönheit und Kunstschönheit dann voneinander unterschie- den? Die Hervorbringungen der Natur sind lediglich Zufallskonstellatio- nen. Allerdings, so Hegel, hat der Zufall es ‘recht’ gemacht, d.h. hat er etwas reizend Stimmiges gefügt, gewahrt der Geist darin das im Sinnli- chen durchscheinende Ideelle. Eben darin wird, mit Adorno gesprochen, die gemeinsame Wurzel des Kunstschönen und des Naturschönen erkennbar. Wer das Naturschöne preist, begebe sich „an den Rand der Afterpoe- sie“, des Kitsches, meint Adorno. Gleichwohl sei es wahr zu sagen, „die Landschaft der Toscana sei schöner als die Umgebung von Gelsenkirchen“ (Adorno 1993, 110, 112). In der Tat. Doch was meinen wir, wenn wir Landschaften, Blumen, Sonnenuntergänge ‘schön’ nennen, und welche Kriterien bringen wir dafür in Anschlag? Im Folgenden möchte ich darle- gen, inwiefern Hegels Charakterisierung des Schönen als „das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee“ diesbezüglich erhellend und klärend ist. Hinweise auf Adornos ästhetische Theorie ergänzen diese Überlegungen. Dem stehen evolutionsbiologische Argumente entgegen, die zunehmend Einfluss auf die ästhetische Diskussion gewinnen. (shrink)

In this comment on Misak’s Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak’s ‘truth-affirming,’ Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak’s Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her ‘analytic pragmatism’ thus far offers few clues about how we should defend such a commitment from skeptical arguments emerging from (...) contemporary analytic metaphysics. I conclude that analytic pragmatists have more work to do in explaining pragmatism’s complex relationship with metaphysics, and defending its core commitments from skeptical threats. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone demostrar que el diseño editorial deconstructivo, a la par que pone en jaque la identidad del lector, en la forma en la que la educación le enseñó que debe reconocerse, lo empuja a identificarse con una nueva forma de ser y comprender el mundo, adquiriendo mayor conciencia de su carácter globalizado, rizomático, polifónico y polisémico. El diseño editorial deconstructivo se levantaba en su momento contra la imposición homogeneizadora de una identidad proclive a la defensa de los (...) valores instituidos por el poder hegemónico. Sin embargo, ese poder, con su capacidad para asimilar en su seno y bajo sus propios valores a lo que en algún momento le fue contestatario, logra convertir en propia a la deconstrucción misma. ¿Por qué? Tal vez sea porque la deconstrucción por sí sola no basta, porque no puede ser el lugar definitivo de llegada, porque tiene que señalar un tránsito hacia alguna otra cosa que es, en definitiva y a la larga, la única que puede darle un verdadero sentido revolucionario. (shrink)

El presente articuLo pretende encuadrar y definir las implicaciones éticas reLativas a La aplicación biomédica de las nanotecnologías, a través de La vaLoración deL estado del arte.Las nanotecnologías, expresiÓn de La habilidad humana de manipuLar la materia a escala atómico/molecular se presentan como un instrumento capaz de modificar la investigaciÓn científica y la medicina de manera radicaL.Debates a todo nivel han subrayado las dificultades de darles una definición clara y unívoca, a causa de la convergencia de diversos ámbitos del saber (...) comprendidos en ellas.No obstante que Las nanotecnoLogías estén ya presentes en las ciencias computacionaLes y en La eLectrÓnica, es en eL ámbito médico-sanitario que se proyectan Las aplicaciones más entusiastas: instrumentos de diagnóstico y suministración de fármacos menos invasivos y más eficaces. Estas tecnoLogías se presentan al mismo tiempo como terapias pero también como instrumentos de prevención únicos, Las mismas características que hacen peculiar eL empLeo de las nano tecnologías en medicina, sugieren también precauciones: por una parte la dimensión mínima de las nanopartículasfacilita su ingreso en el organismo humano, traspasando las defensas naturales del organismo, agilizando una distribuciÓn de los fármacos altamente precisa. Por otra parte, estas mismas características pueden revelarse dañinas para el organismo humano .Dado que se trata de tecnología en rápida progresiÓn cuyos adelantos no son fáciles de predecir. los riesgos, aunque sÓlo aquellos potenciales, deben ser cuidadosamente valorados ya sea para las aplicaciones presentes como para aquellas futuras.Por tanto, encuadrar las implicaciones bioéticas de las nanotecnologías significa comprender y valorar su impacto sobre la salud humana. (shrink)

Las «metáforas», «analogías» o «alegorías» tienen un lugar bien ganado en la tradición filosófica. Han sido atacadas por dar lugar a una interpretación poco rigurosa de las nociones que describen, pues permite asociarles propiedades que originalmente no se había pensado (ni resulta deseable) que formen parte de su concepto. Sin embargo, a pesar del reclamo en favor de procedimientos estrictos de definición, el uso de una imagen apropiada suele ser el mejor modo de explicar esas cuestiones que cada siglo escapan (...) a la disección que el filo de las mejores definiciones pretendía darle. Tal es el caso de las ilustraciones usadas por Charles S. Peirce en sus artículos "Algunas consecuencias de cuatro incapacidades" y "Cómo esclarecer nuestras ideas" para dar cuenta del pensamiento. Primero veremos el papel que juegan estas imágenes en la argumentación conque Peirce establece dos principios importantes de su filosofía: el de que toda cognición se encuentra determinada por otras cogniciones previas, y el de que no tenemos ningún poder de introspección. Luego hallaremos que dos de las imágenes presentan cierta incompatibilidad en un aspecto especialmente relevante desde el punto de vista de lo que tratan de ilustrar. Para finalizar, consideraremos una explicación que sea consistente con los textos y que permita resolver la discrepancia, brindando una mejor comprensión conjunta de ambas ilustraciones . (shrink)

Este libro alberga tres motivos entrelazados -uno estético, uno práctico y uno teórico-. El motivo estético consistió en llegar a exponer tres niveles de análisis en el interior de una sola gran historia. El motivo práctico gravitó en la reducción lógica del argumento, para poder darle "musculatura" al texto, y mostrar así su concepto de la manera más clara y directa posible. Ambos motivos quedaron relativamente bien resueltos. El problema teórico residió ante todo en poder hacer de la unidad un (...) movimiento de la libertad, cuestión que requirió primero elevar la unidad a su forma suprema. A partir de ese dilema apareció además la necesidad de responder a la pregunta ¿por qué Hegel? Dicho en pocas palabras, porque a partir de su filosofía es posible pensar la unidad como autodeterminación múltiple. De ahí que el objeto de este libro no sea tanto defender la "diferencia" y la "multitud", cuanto más bien se trata de mostrar que la unidad puede ser en sí misma libre y diferente. La realización de esta unidad negativa e infinita debe entonces conjugar con lo otro, razonar lo heredado, asumirse como la totalidad de las diferencias y considerar a aquella diferencia como su verdad. Pero estas formas de unidad desarrolladas -unidades masivas, relativas y plenas; unidades concomitantes, constituyentes y soberanas; unidades singulares, particulares y universales, o unidades silogísticas- tienen lugar únicamente cuando ha sido forjado un bastidor de tejidos programáticos, o un juego metódico de conceptos. En ellos se realiza entonces y al fin la circulación efectiva entre las esferas disyuntivas que despliegan la vitalidad creadora del "espíritu de un pueblo". Este problema, en cambio, aún no está resuelto, y es más bien una tarea por hacer. (shrink)

I defend a novel pragmatist account of truth that I call ‘truth from the agent point of view’ or ‘agential truth’, drawing on insights from Hilary Putnam. According to the agential view, as inquirers, when we take something to be truth-apt, we are taking ourselves and all other thinkers to be accountable to getting right a shared target that is independent of any individual's or community's view of that target. That we have this relationship to truth is what enables our (...) practices of disagreement and agreement, even when subject to the glare of self-conscious reflection, and represents a crucial ingredient in our capacity for rational thought. The resulting account shares elements with Huw Price's and Cheryl Misak's views, but also has important advantages over both. It also yields a surprising conclusion—that our best pragmatist account of truth may well be a version of the correspondence theory of truth. (shrink)

I revisit my paper, ‘Grace de Laguna’s 1909 Critique of Analytic Philosophy’ and respond to the commentary on it. I respond to James Chase and Jack Reynolds by further analysing the difference between speculative philosophy as de Laguna conceived of it and analytic philosophy, by clarifying how her critique of analytic philosophy remains relevant to some of its more speculative forms, and by explaining what justifies the criticism of established opinion that goes along with her rejection of analytic philosophy’s epistemic (...) conservatism. In response to Andreas Vrahimis, I contextualise my reading of de Laguna’s work in 1909. This clarifies her critique of pragmatism, distinguishes it from her critique of epistemically conservative philosophy, and shows that she was not only already aware of the full scope of the latter critique but is likely to have identified the then incipient analytic philosophy as its primary target. Also, contra Vrahimis, her argument is effective against Bertrand Russell’s later, epistemically conservative approach to philosophy. In response to Cheryl Misak, I point out that her argument that de Laguna is, despite herself, a pragmatist rests on a misunderstanding of the differences between pragmatism and idealism, and I show that de Laguna’s main early influences were Herbert Spencer and her teacher, James Edwin Creighton. I further argue that Misak’s rejection of de Laguna’s critique of pragmatism rests on a misrepresentation of the critique. (shrink)

El autor presenta la historia de las ondas gravitacionales según Einstein, uniéndola a su biografía y a su época con el fin de comprenderla en su conexión con la historia de los semitas, la personalidad de Einstein en el manejo de sus circunstancias generadoras de conflicto en sus relaciones de competencia con sus colegas y en la formulación de la llamada teoría general de la relatividad. Recaeremos en las vicisitudes que vivió Einstein en el tránsito de que su trabajo científico (...) pasara a la ciencia normal como un pilar de la física teórica. Trataremos como Einstein introdujo el éter relativístico confiriéndole un “olor de materialidad” a su explicación geométrica de la gravedad, donde indudablemente, no cabe, pero que él tuvo que ceder ante la presión eso sí justificada de sus más connotados colegas, liderados por Lorentz. Einstein lo tuvo que hacer para mantenerse en la cola que lo llevaría al Nobel. Fue así, como desarrollando el hilo del éter relativista, en junio de 1916, introdujo las ondas gravitacionales de las que, en un acto de liberación personal y honradez científica, cuando pudo, en 1938, demostró como no podían existir, dentro del escenario de su relatividad, para de inmediato también darle fin al éter relativista. (shrink)